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Abstract. Economic reality has shown that current enforcement techniques will produce the desired 
finalities, avoiding distortion under psychological decision of all members of society and reduce the current 
costs of tax administration. Therefore, taxation is the product of social factors, which determine, before any 
other factors widely and work closely on the social physiognomy, which causes various and numerous 
effects, that could be considered synthetic, two-way, as expressed sequence all taxpayers reactions taxes, such 
as tastes and scale transformation of values, the redistribution of costs, savings, debt and changing conditions 
of work and life, in general. 
The functioning of a democratic regime depends not only institutions which carry out the division of labor 
between the executive and legislature, but also of a number of formal rules and informal procedures through 
which political actors influence the operation of the system. The objective is to provide some empirical 
evidencies of relation between fiscal policy and electoral cicles. The main output consist in this thesis that 
some support could be found for this, in Roumania. 
Keywords: fiscal policy, electoral cycle, correlation between fiscal policy and electoral cycle 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Since it is known that fiscal pressure reflect the degree of support, seeing it in balance with the 
contributor's payment power and the facilities granted, in order not to affect contributor's life 
conditions and not to discourage the initiative to take action, taxation should not reach levels the 
society cannot bear. 
It is considered that one should not pass beyond the limit where its efficiency is decreased (it leads to 
stagnation, even economical decrease); otherwise, fiscal pressure is not the same for everyone and 
under tax actions, the sacrifices for citizens are different. 
Therefore, the preoccupation of public authorities should be oriented to reducing discrepancies in 
order to achieve full fiscal equity, this way showing another social effect of taxes and a more complete 
justice in allocating tasks to society members. 
This brings to front a multi-dimensional perspective of politics, that is the institutional dimension 
(polity), legal and contents dimension (policy) and the procedural policy (politics). 
Our interest shall reduce only to the legal dimension (policy) referring to the aims, tasks and policy's 
objects, identifying in this the understanding manner of the fiscal policy and the procedural dimension, 
having as purpose the mediation of interest by conflicting situations and consensus. 
Thus, the way policy is designed and the way the tasks are being accomplished, depend by various 
interests, thus identifying the clear relationship between fiscal policy and the political decision.It 
remains however to demonstrate whether there is a causality relationship between the two variables. 
In international theory and practice, there two ways to manifest democratic systems, which allow the 
conversion of individual preferences in collective preferences by means of the voting mechanism: 
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direct democracy (pure) and indirect democracy (representative).1 Thus, in states with representative 
democracy, relationships arisen between „voters-citizens” which express preferences by voting 
instrument, rulers-legislative powers, who make decisions in virtue of the representation power given 
by the vote, and executors-bureaucrats, who undertake organization activities regarding the 
enforcement of public decisions made by rulers” should be accepted2. 
 
 
2 Theoretical background 
 
Often elections reduce the time horizon of governments, and they risk compromising the social and 
economical activities, in disadvantage of votes, as simple and reducible techniques, ignoring the 
democratic fundament of citizens’ options representation. Drazen (2000), Persson (2001), as well as 
Persson şi Tabellini (2001) study the way fiscal politics is influenced by the electoral and political 
cycles characteristics, showing at the same time which is the motivation to use discretionary fiscal 
policy in certain moments. In this respect, four groups of theoreticians have been separated, who take 
into consideration the opportunistic elective cycle, according to Nordhaus (1975), Rogoff and Sibert 
(1988), the partisan elective cycle, according to Hibbs (1977) and Alesina (1987), the idiosyncratic 
changes, incompetence and voracity, according to Stokey (2002) and the non-adjustment or late 
adjustment periods to shocks due to the impossibility to build coalitions or alliances, according to 
Alesina şi Drazen (1991), Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno (2002).  
 
 
3 Method and results 
 
Elections represent the basic principle of representative democracies and they ensure the rulers their 
political legitimacy. From a formal point of view, the voting procedures, electoral operation, such as 
establishing circumscriptions, organizing election centers, making lists, defining the elector and 
elected capacity etc are regulated by the Electoral Law. The political representation depends on 
technical aspects, the parties’ system and government formation method. Crucial for the popular vote 
transformation in representation at the parliaments or other elected institutions remains the electoral 
system. It influences the parties system functioning, which, in its turn, triggers the governs’ stability 
and characteristics.3 
Beyond it being a simple technique, the electoral system reports itself to political or existing political 
cultures it interacts with. In our country, the general elections take place every four years when 
members of the Parliament – Deputies’ Chamber and Senate are elected. Their mandate lasts 4 years. 
At the same time elections for the County and City Councils are organized. 
Romanian electorate voting preferences have changed during time as follows: 
 
                                                 
1
 Mutașcu M.I., Enache C., Lobonț Oana, Crâșneac Alexandru, Nicolescu Cristina, „Finanţe publice - caiet de seminar”, 
Editura Universitară, 2008, pag. 26 
2 Mazzucato G., Mossetto G., Petrovich G., Rizzi D., „Lezioni di scienza delle finanze”, Giappichelli Editore, Torino, 1991, 
pag.122. 
3
 The pillars of the Romanian electoral system are the Constitution adopted in 1991 and revised in 2003 through a national 
referendum, Act no 373/2004 for the election of the President of Romania and Act no 67/2004 for the election of public local 
administration authorities. 
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Table 1 Political Cycles and Electoral Cycles in Romania, during the timeframe 1990-2012 
Analysis 
timeframe 
Electoral 
cycle 
Elections 
Date Government 
Parliament 
Representation 
Political 
cycle 
Taxes 
(%) 
 
Public 
expenses 
(%) 
1990 General 
elections 20.05.1990 FDSN 28,50% 
political 
cycle 
1990-
1996 
classified: 
1990-
1992 
1992-
1996 
35,5 34.1 
1991 
ciclul 
electoral 
1990-1992 
   33,2 
37.0 
1992 
General, 
local and 
national 
elections 
27.09.1992 PDSR 34% 33,5 
30.8 
1993 electoral 
cycle1992-
1996 
   31,3 33.8 
1994    28,2 33.4 
1995    28,8 34.7 
1996 
General, 
local and 
national 
elections 
03.11.1996 CDR 30,70% political 
cycle 
1996-
2000 
26,9 
33.8 
1997 electoral 
cycle1996-
2000 
   26,5 33.9 
1998    27,8 35.1 
1999    30,1 35.5 
2000 
General, 
local and 
national 
elections 
26.11.2000 PSD 36,60% political 
cycle 
2000-
2004 
29,2 
35.3 
2001 electoral 
cycle 2000-
2004 
   28 33.3 
2002    27,6 32.2 
2003    27 30.9 
2004 
Legislative 
and 
presidential 
elections 
28.11.2004 
“DA” 
Alliance 
PNL-PD – 
Right and 
truth, until  
2007 
* 
political 
cycle 
2004-
2008 
27,1 
29.8 
2005 political 
cycle 2004-
2008 
   27,2 31.0 
2006    28,1 31.6 
2007 European 
elections 25.11.2007   30 37.5 
2008 
General, 
local and 
national 
elections 
30.11.2008 
PSD-PD-L  
Alliance 
until  2009 
66,80% 29,4 
37.4 
2009 
European 
and 
presidential 
elections 
07.06.2009 
22.11.2009   
political 
cycle 
2008-
2012 
29,5 
38.2 
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Analysis 
timeframe 
Electoral 
cycle 
Elections 
Date Government 
Parliament 
Representation 
Political 
cycle 
Taxes 
(%) 
 
Public 
expenses 
(%) 
2010 electoral 
cycle 2008-
2012 
   29,6 38.2 
2011    29,9 37.8 
2012 Legislative 
elections    30,2 37.9 
* lack of official data 
Source: performed by the authors based on data provided by the Central Electoral Bureau and the 
International Monetary Fund, Country Report nr. 06/169/2006 and International Monetary Fund, 
Country Report nr. 09/183/2009 
 
 
The public politics performance process, i.e. cycle of public politics, is complex and involves 
dimensions, mechanisms and actors in a network of interrelations. One of the best known means to 
make it easier to understand is that of dividing the process in more stages and sub-stages. The cycle of 
a politics is the series of these stages in more stages and sub-stages and examining them represents a 
simpler way to understand this process, but in this paper we have not proposed to analyze it in 
dynamics. 
In order to perceive the possible connections between the configuration of the fiscal policy and the 
route of the electoral cycle, we can choose a simple analytical frame, described formally by: 
 
1tttt guvαX ε+=
     (1.) 
t1tt µαα += −
 
 
where: 
X = the level of the fiscal politics variable in the current t timeframe; 
guv = dummy variable, the electoral cycle; 
α
 = the sensitivity parameters of the fiscal policy in the electoral cycle; 
tµ ε,
 = „white noises”, of null average and final variance. 
 
The dummy variable, the electoral cycle has two values: 
− 1, if the political entity, alliance or governing party has remained for another mandate  
(governing continuity); 
− 0, if the political entity, alliance or party has changed (governing alternation). 
 
By applying a Kalman filter on the dataset represented by the taxes we have the following results:  
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The results of  Kalman model for the time series of public expenditures 
Table no 2 
 
 
Metod: Maximum likelihood (Marquardt)  
Perioada de analiză: 1990 2012   
Included observations: 23   
     
     
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C(2) 6.797139 0.672887 10.10146 0.0000 
     
     
 Final State Root MSE z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     α
 33.93999 13.38119 2.536395 0.0112 
ε
 0.000000 29.92126 0.000000 1.0000 
     
     Log likelihood -125.4204  Akaike information criterion 10.99308 
Parameters 1 Schwarz information criterion 11.04245 
Diffuse priors 2 Hannan-Quinn information criterion 11.00549 
     
     
 
 
 
The results of  Kalman model for the time series of public fiscal revenues 
Table no 3 
 
Metoda: Maximum likelihood (Marquardt)  
Perioada de analiză: 1990 2012   
Număr observaţii: 23   
     
     
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C(2) 6.400155 0.696508 9.188920 0.0000 
     
     
 Final State Root MSE z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     α
 30.99999 10.97213 2.825340 0.0047 
ε
 0.000000 24.53443 0.000000 1.0000 
     
     Log likelihood -120.8510  Akaike information criterion 10.59574 
Parameters 1 Schwarz information criterion 10.64511 
Diffuse priors 2 Hannan-Quinn information criterion 10.60816 
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The results of  Kalman model for electoral cycle 
Table no 4 
Method: Maximum likelihood (Marquardt)  
Perioada de analiză: 1990 2012   
Număr observaţii: 23   
     
     
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C(2) -2.076364 0.395695 -5.247389 0.0000 
     
     
 Final State Root MSE z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SV1 -0.085963 0.027748 -3.097933 0.0019 
SV2 0.110193 0.032988 3.340396 0.0008 
SV3 0.000000 0.354098 0.000000 1.0000 
     
     Log likelihood -38.55885  Akaike information criterion 3.439900 
Parameters 1 Schwarz information criterion 3.489270 
Diffuse priors 3 Hannan-Quinn information criterion 3.452316 
     
     
 
The electoral cycles analysis might conducted by mistaken interpretation, these being perceived by a 
non-familiarized observer with the Romanian reality as a sign of admirable stability and political 
predictability. To the electoral cycle predictability one could add the governing alternation or 
continuity and the existence of a functional market economy, certified by the European Union. 
This analytical frame allows the estimation of the changes occurred in the sensitivity parameter during 
the analysis timeframe: 
0
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Chart no 1. Sensitivity parameter evolution: public expenses 
 
We can observe that during the timeframe 1994-1996 a continuous growth tendency has been 
observed in respect with the amplitude of the connection between the electoral cycle and the public 
expense. When the electoral cycle has begun in 1996, these connections have been stabilized, and the 
fiscal policy, in its turn, has stabilized its sensitivity during the electoral cycle. 
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Chart no 2. Sensitivity parameter evolution: taxes 
 
The same conclusions can be drawn from taking into consideration the taxes as synthesis variable. 
The operation of a democratic regime does not depend only on institutions which perform the labor 
division between executive and legislative, but also by a number of formal rules and informal 
procedures through which the political actors influence regime operation. In this context, the debate 
regarding the voting system is tightly connected to the consolidation of democratic processes. And the 
adopted electoral system can influence both the parties system as well as the political participation. 
The key of the reform process of the political class recruitment systems lies in the capacity of the 
parties to change, to reorganize their structure and correctly and responsibly understand their dominant 
role. The functionality of a parties’ system depends on the way electoral constrictions created a certain 
political environment, both for the competition system organization, as well from a strategic 
perspective. The new electoral system introduced for the general elections on November 30, 2008, is 
proportional with candidates in uninominal colleges. 
 
4 Conclusions 
 
These results suggest that in Romania, there is no complete correction mechanism of the fiscal politics 
reported to the electoral cycle, and some triggering causes can be identified: 
• absence of a ideological coagulation, and thus of a doctrine change of the fiscal politics; 
• preservation of the pro-cyclical nature of the fiscal politics, regardless of changes in the social and 
political architecture; 
• practical behavior, with a reduced number of prevention components of public authorities and 
adopting the public decisions set through inept mechanisms; 
• the adjusting nature of the fiscal politics in detriment of its reactive nature; 
• preservation of some political system-specific cleavages, which impressed the bipolar system 
characteristics; 
• ideological or conjuncture affiliation, beginning with the year 1992 to the present day, which show 
a polarization of the parliamentary political parties; 
• using administrative decisions as substitute for the lack of support from an adequate mix of 
politics; 
To all these causes one adds the organizational instability of political alliances, marked by separations, 
internal fights, temporary or permanent ruptures, which led to the continuous modelation of the 
political scene and not last, the opportunistic way in which the opposition parties have developed their 
activity, adding also the electors’ opportunism.  
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